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The Pedagogy of the Old Case
Method: A Tribute to “Bull” Warren
Paul D. Carrington
Editors’ Note: With publication of “The Pedagogy of the Old Case Method: A Tribute to
‘Bull’ Warren,” the Journal of Legal Education inaugurates a new occasional feature, “Legends
of the Legal Academy,” focused on law teachers whose lessons and teaching style left an enduring
imprint on their students, their institutions, and the profession. The Editors welcome submissions
profiling professors whose teaching and scholarship made a similarly strong and lasting impact.
In my youth almost a half-century ago, I attended a school dedicated to the
subordination of its students. The teachers made incessant demands on their
students. Inadequacies in their performances were publicly observed without
pity and often in the most insulting terms.
We students at that school were almost randomly selected. We did not
choose to go there and, indeed, most of us did not want to go to school at
all. Certainly none of us relished the incessant demands and insults. We were
forced to do what had to be done when it had to be done, and we gradually
acquired the habit of prompt obedience.
But we acquired other traits as well. The teachers’ seeming inhumanity
had at least three redemptive consequences. The most obvious was that it
demonstrated their conviction that their work, and hence the work they
demanded of their students, was important and possible. They could not
have all been that grouchy had they been taking their tasks lightly or had they
expected that we would fail if we tried hard enough.
Secondly, their gruffness conferred on most of us a valuable sense of
survivorship. Most of us succeeded at least marginally at the seemingly
important feats required, and they were not easy. Especially for those of us who
were not very good students in that school, minimal success was a considerable
Paul D. Carrington is Professor of Law, Duke University. This essay is a modification of a
comment on Duncan Kennedy’s youthful assault on the legal education that he had recently
experienced, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy: A Polemic Against the System
(1983). Kennedy’s book was republished in 2003 by the New York University Press, with my
comment as an addendum to its republication. Laura Kalman and Todd Miller made helpful
suggestions on an early draft of that comment.
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gratification. To use a term not then known, most of us acquired a new
measure of self-esteem derived not from praise by others but from achievement
permitting self-praise. In part, this was because failure was obviously possible;
a few students who could not achieve minimum standards were sent home.
Finally, the teachers’ hateful conduct created among the students a sense
of interdependency—they provided their students with a common adversary
against whom we could and did respond together. We formed bonds of
mutual trust. We became artificial siblings. This was extraordinary, given that
our backgrounds of race and class were as different as can be imagined, and
that the school had only very recently been racially desegregated.
I was twenty-four years old when I attended that school, and I was a lawyer.
Most of my fellow students in 1955 were nineteen or twenty. My special brothers
included a black operator of a shoe shine stand at the Corpus Christi railroad
station, a Hispanic grocery clerk from San Antonio, a black warehouse guard
from Oakland, and a Japanese-American from Redding who had lived for four
years in an internment camp in Utah. My immediate circle also included a
butcher from Las Vegas and a guy who aspired to be a professional golfer. One
of them may well have been gay; we did not ask and he did not tell. It was my
buddy from Corpus Christi who pushed me over the training barricade that
I was not strong enough to climb. He saved me from additional humiliation
and stress, a kind deed I could never have repaid. The school was, of course,
basic infantry training, and almost all of us had been selected by our local
draft boards.
From my present perspective, I would have to say that basic infantry training
was the most effective educational institution I ever had the opportunity to
observe. The Phillips Exeter Academy (from which I was quite appropriately
expelled) and the Harvard Law School (from which I was not expelled) made
strong impressions on me, and the other schools I attended were also pretty
good. But neither Exeter nor Harvard achieved in years what the United States
Army did in weeks to make adults out of almost all of us involuntary selectees.
I have, alas, not kept up with my military brothers, but I am as certain as one
can be about such matters that they met the chances of life with measurably
greater competence and composure than they would have absent what the
Army did to and for them in eight short weeks. Happily, I know almost for
certain that none of them was ever in military combat.
My respect for what the Army did is not linked to any militaristic impulses
on my part. I was grateful that the Army thought me unpromising as an
infantryman, and later trained me to type and fill out forms. I was never
happier than the day I left active duty as a soldier. But passage of more than a
half-century has not erased my affection for my military buddies, nor has my
distaste for the military enterprise prevented me from continuing to admire the
drill sergeants (perhaps especially the brutal black female corporal) who did
their work with such spirit and effect.
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In varying degrees, hierarchy is indispensable to all human endeavors
entailing organized collaboration. Most that are worthwhile require it. One
can draw a picture without hierarchy, but one cannot play in an orchestra.
An infantry unit without hierarchy is a mob, and one organized by students
passionately resistant to hierarchy1 would, in military combat, have been a
suicide pact. Could there be a ballet troupe, a basketball team, a hospital, or
an industrial organization of whatever kind in a leftist heaven that excluded
hierarchy? Many of our most valued freedoms depend on restraints imposed
by hierarchs of one kind or another, and there is, therefore, nothing inherently
wrong with reproducing it in a classroom devoted to professional training.
Everything depends on the purpose of a hierarchy and the fitness of its
methods to that purpose.
No mid-20th century law school such as the one I attended was reproducing
hierarchy for its own sake. Law schools were then striving to fit their students
for professional work in a world filled will all kinds of hierarchies, many bad
but many good.2 They were, among other objectives, trying to fit their students
with the moral and intellectual strength and self-confidence to exercise prudent
professional judgment in distinguishing good from bad and to withstand
the sometimes horrific stress they would experience in vigorously contested
circumstances of whatever sort. Most law teachers then supposed, whether
correctly or not, that treating adult students as immature persons needing
emotional nurture and intellectual succor was not the way to prepare them for
the moral and intellectual combat that pervades the work of American lawyers.
My most stressful moment came about six weeks into the first year. Professor
Austin Scott called on me to inform the class of 125 students about the next
case. I froze, and said that I was not prepared. His response was: “Well, Mr.
Carrington, what have you read? We will talk about that.” It helped that he
had a twinkle in his eye, and I did survive to find something to say.
But if some students found the stress of managing their own professional
development too stressful and left the school to pursue a different career, that
was not a cause for regret but an indication that the schools were serving their
students (perhaps especially the former students who left) and the public well.
The war in Vietnam and the reactions it engendered among students tended
to infect law student anxiety with mistrust of teachers as persons engaged
merely in self-gratification. The mistrust was compounded by the arrival in
law schools in numbers, first of students of color, and then of women, many
of whom were quick to suppose that teachers were motivated by an ambition
to humiliate them. It is possible that many of the women were “hard-wired” to
need and thus demand mentoring relationships that law teachers of that time
were not equipped to supply. As a consequence of the efforts by law teachers to
1.

E.g., Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy: A Polemic
Against the System (New York Univ. Press 2003).

2.

For an account of the Yale Law School of that era, see Laura Kalman, Yale Law School and
The Sixties: Revolt and Reverberations (Univ. of North Carolina Press 2005).
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respond to student mistrust and their demands for nurture, law school became
almost everywhere less stressful, and students were less frequently required to
participate actively and competitively in their own instruction.
If law teachers of that and earlier times were right in their assumptions that
they were not merely instructing students in law but were preparing them for
professional work as lawyers, and that professional work is in almost all its
forms competitive and stressful, and often laden with moral ambiguities, the
reforms effected in response to the mistrust of their students may have been
counterproductive. Law school graduates may have been less well prepared
than they might have been for the professional work they sought to perform.
And they may have had less moral autonomy of the sort that enabled them to
withstand the corruption and moral squalor that is the stuff of human conflict
with which lawyers must deal.
For example, would the lawyers who later helped the accountants shred
Enron documents have performed more admirably had they been better
educated in law school? Would the lawyers advising the reckless bankers of
the 21st century have given better advice had they been better educated? I
reject the arrogant utterance of Professor Felix Frankfurter that “lawyers are
what the law schools make them.”3 The opposite would be far more accurate.
Steven Pinker has thoroughly refuted the widely shared premise that our
children, or even our law students, are blank slates on which we can write a
message of our choosing.4 Mostly, students, even law students, get their morals
from their peers. If Enron’s or the bankers’ lawyers grew up among neighbors
and attended schools and universities with fellow students who measure one
another by such superficialities as their annual earnings, without regard for
their professional integrity or the worthiness of the services they perform,
no professional school can do very much to change that. Nevertheless, mid20th century law teachers may not have been wrong to suppose that moral
education is possible. And moral education may be the most important and
enduring consequence of good professional training in law.
If law teachers today sought to prepare their students to withstand the
moral squalor they are certain to encounter in performing legal services,
how might they pursue that goal? They might seek to foster in their students
the gratification that comes from earned self-respect derived from surviving
rigorous demands with little help from intellectual and moral nursemaids, in
the hope that the moral and intellectual autonomy thus developed might be
put, at least sometimes, to good public use. Would a law school guided by
such aims resemble basic infantry training? Maybe a little.
3.

Letter to R. Rosenwald, May 13, 1927, quoted in Rand Jack & Dana Crowley Jack, Moral
Vision and Professional Decisions: The Changing Values of Women and Men Lawyers 156
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1989).

4.

Steven Pinker, The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature (Penguin Books
2002).
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Or maybe it would bear more resemblance to the law school that featured
the teaching of Edward “Bull” Warren, whose legendary antics recorded in the
lore of the Harvard Law School provided the anecdotes in Paper Chase.5 The
school in which he taught took form in the late 19th century in response to the
idea of Charles Eliot, Harvard’s president, who predicted that if law school
were made long and hard, the most promising professional students would be
attracted by the challenge and opportunity to elevate themselves within the
social and professional hierarchy.6
In the academic marketplace of the 19th century, Eliot’s idea was a resounding
success. Accordingly, The Bull’s students were attracted by his sometimes
brutal manners that supplied the basis for his fame among several generations
of Harvard Law students. A native of Worcester, his transformative experience
was a leadership role on the Harvard Crimson, where he learned that rejection
by President Eliot was a first step to triumph.7 He experienced legal education
with four memorable professors. The teacher he most admired was James Barr
Ames who conducted classes “chiefly by means of Socratic dialogues between
himself and fifteen or twenty of the best students who formed, so to speak, a
Greek chorus.”8 But he also observed that Judge Jeremiah Smith was a man
“overflowing with the milk of human kindness.”9 In 1899, while Warren was
a third year student, he was identified by Dean Ames as a promising teacher
who would employ the rigorous Ames style. But he practiced with a large firm
in New York before returning to the law school in 1904 to become a legendary
teacher on the Ames model.
It was no part of Warren’s objective as a Socratic teacher to train students
to be weak subordinates in morally corrupt hierarchies, as some students in
later generations may have supposed that their teachers were doing.10 Students
who survived The Bull’s teaching were more likely, The Bull thought, to insist
5.

All the stories in that celebrated novel were circulating at the Harvard Law School in 1952
when I was a first year student. It is not unlikely that many of them had gained color from
frequent repetition. The novelist used all but one of the stories I heard about “Bull” Warren.
The one that the novelist did not use was my favorite. It was reported that a student was
so agitated after reading the Property examination questions that he drank his ink. He was
taken to a convenient nursing station in Ames Hall where the ink could be pumped out of
his stomach. As he was returning to consciousness, The Bull entered the nursing station and
asked him how he was feeling. “OK, I guess, Professor Warren.” “That’s good,” The Bull
was alleged to have said, “because you have only forty-five minutes to finish the exam.”

6.

On Eliot’s selection of Dean Langdell, see Bruce A. Kimball, The Inception of Modern
Professional Education: C.C. Langdell, 1826–1906 86 (Univ. of North Carolina Press 2009);
on his influence on the school, see id. passim.

7.

Edward H. Warren, Spartan Education 3 (Houghton Mifflin 1942).

8.

Id. at 7. Kimball, supra note 6, at 262, describes Ames as often insulting and dismissive in
class.

9.

Id. at 6.

10.

For an account of Harvard Law School in Kennedy’s time as a student at Yale, see Joel
Seligman, The High Citadel: The Influence of Harvard Law School 93–201 (Houghton
Mifflin 1978).
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on thinking for themselves. In his retrospection, he observed that the most
important attribute a lawyer can have is “the confidence of other people that
he can be trusted always to do the decent thing.”11 It is not obvious that this
trait is acquired by the Socratic method. But his students were likely to have
shared a sense that what they had achieved was important, and perhaps not
merely to themselves. They might also have gained self-respect by surviving an
emotional as well as an intellectual challenge. And they might have tended to
bond with their classmates as members of a profession making moral demands.
The key to professional virtue in Warren’s mind was discipline:
I believe in discipline. From boyhood days on, I have sought to discipline
my own mind, pen and tongue. (As a teacher) I have sought to discipline the
minds, pen, and tongues of my students. I have never suffered fools gladly,
and regard such sufferances as mischievous.12

In his way, The Bull plainly strove to “teach law in the grand manner,” as
Holmes had designated the method.13 The larger aim was, as Holmes had it, to
enable the student to become “reasonable, and see things in their proportion”:
Nay, more, that he should be passionate as well as reasonable—that he should
be able not only to explain, but to feel, that the ardors of intellectual pursuit
should be relieved by the charms of art, should be succeeded by the joy of life,
become an end in itself.14

One may be skeptical that the Socratic method as practiced by “Bull”
Warren could have achieved the intended outcome. Yet, I have actually known
quite a few of “Bull” Warren’s students because my father was one of them,
and over the years I met many of his Harvard Law 1917 contemporaries, and
more than a few manifested the traits The Bull sought to “nurture.”
I never had occasion to discuss with any of them their reactions to The
Bull. I wonder how he might have scored on 21st century student evaluations
of his teaching. All his students whom I met except my father were in their
seniority when I met them. Some were rather pompous, self-seeking persons
who might, as best I could tell, have been the sort of lawyers who would have
shredded Enron documents without a blink, and papered over the misdeeds
of 21st century bankers, at least if well paid to do so. But others I knew were
morally formidable and autonomous persons who would have participated
11.

Warren, supra note 7, at 28.

12.

Id. at ix.

13.

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Use of Law Schools, in Speeches 265 (Little, Brown and
Co. 1913). For that and many other contemporaneous comments on the teaching method,
see The History of Legal Education in the United States: Commentaries and Primary
Sources 495–583 (Steve Sheppard ed., Salem Press 1999). A bibliography on the subject is
provided in The Centennial History of the Harvard Law School 1817–1917, 365–376 (Harvard
Law School Association 1918).

14.

Id.
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in such a desperate act only after exercising independent and critical moral
judgment and reaching the unlikely conclusion that the world would be a
better place if the documents were shredded or the loans repackaged.
This assessment is not based merely on my intuitive reading of their
characters. Dean Acheson,15 for one member of the class, had the moral starch
in 1937 to resign as Undersecretary of the Treasury because of his belief that
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s monetary policy was morally reprehensible.
In 1948, he (with Secretary of State George Marshall) gave President Truman
the very unwelcome advice that recognition of a Zionist state would result in a
permanent state of undeclared war between the United States and the Muslim
world. In 1949, he improvidently stood up for Alger Hiss. In 1951, he stood up
to Joseph McCarthy.
My father’s roommate, a fellow Missourian, Claude Cross, practiced
in Boston for many years, and exhibited his moral toughness when he
undertook the defense of Alger Hiss. One may question Cross’s judgment
if he lied on his client’s behalf, but one cannot question his moral toughness
and independence.16 Raeburn Green, another Missourian, practiced in Saint
Louis, advising business clients, and in 1950, pro bono publico, he defended
members of the Communist Party against diverse criminal charges.
Kenneth Royall practiced in Raleigh representing business interests until
he was activated as a colonel in the JAG Corps. A few months thereafter, in
1942, he was assigned to defend German saboteurs, and he took their case to
civil courts and to the Supreme Court of the United States in direct defiance
of his commander-in-chief.17 He lost the case but cherished the admiring note
he received from a client shortly before the client’s execution. Royall also took
a stand against Senator McCarthy.18
And the end of that Senator’s vicious tirade came when Joe Welch, a farm
boy from Iowa who had spent a career trying cases in Boston, stood up to him
on behalf of clients he was serving pro bono publico. What Acheson, Cross,
Green, Royall, and Welch did in these events was to put their careers at risk to
do what they perceived to be “the decent thing.” Other members of that Class
of 1917 (including my father) performed other less noted acts, public services
sometimes rendered at substantial cost to themselves.
No one can say that any of these courageous public acts were a consequence
of the teaching of The Bull. But it is possible that they learned in law school to
look out for their own moral standards without close guidance from mentors,
15.

Acheson wrote four volumes of autobiography and he is the subject of five biographies.

16.

He argued that lawyers sometimes have a duty to lie in Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of
Advocacy, 4 Stan. L. Rev. 3 (1951). A response is Henry S. Drinker, Some Remarks on Mr.
Curtis’ “The Ethics of Advocacy,” 4 Stan. L. Rev. 349 (1952).

17.

Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); for an account, see Paul D. Carrington, A Military Salute,
12 Green Bag 2d 19 (2008).

18.

See his essay, American Freedom and the Law: Fighting the Communist Menace, 40 A.B.A.
J. 559 (1953).
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and gained confidence in their ability to do so. I am sure that many of them
practiced law with moral courage, and we can say that The Bull’s teaching, so
despicable to many students of a later generation, had that result as its aim.
Maybe it even had some of that effect. I doubt that teachers who would have
provided more gratification and comfort to students of Duncan Kennedy’s
generation would have been likely to have done better in training students to
stand on their own moral and intellectual feet.
I wonder how The Bull would teach law students in the 21st century. He
would have to deal with the troubling change in law firms advising large
corporate enterprises such as Enron as well as those attorneys more recently
revealed to share responsibility for the economic chaos of 2008. Lawyers
in such organizations are increasingly subordinates in hierarchies that are
sometimes uncaring.19 While members of the Class of 1917 were often called
by their clients for broad advice, today’s large firm partners less frequently
have the kind of stable relationship with their clients that results in that kind
of consultation. It may well be, for example, that no independent lawyer (i.e.,
one who had not been subordinated by his or her corporate managers) was
ever invited to give advice about the antics of many of the corporate executives
who have recently been disgraced. What legal advice could and should have
been given to Lehman Brothers or AIG? Even The Bull could not hope to do
much about their irresponsible behavior.
Moreover, even The Bull would need to confront the destructive force of
law school rankings, which have a paralyzing effect on the freedom of most law
schools to do anything that might diminish their relative standings. Virtually
every measurement of law schools employed in rankings counts expenditures,
and virtually all available funds must be spent to protect schools rankings.
Also, their shared preoccupation with such matters must tend to reinforce in
students a sense that it is affect and not substance that matters. Law students
are now consumers. Maybe today’s basic infantry trainees are, too.
A few years ago, I proposed my own Utopian law school for the 21st
century.20 My proposal requires an elite university with an endowment that
its trustees might be willing to invest in the creation of a morally independent
legal profession of lawyers unwilling to surrender their autonomy to mindless
or greedy hierarchs. My Utopian law school would simply foreswear tuition,
proclaiming that it would conduct the best three-year program it could
without charging students for it. Classes would be large, and services other
than classroom teaching would be minimal. In order to assure their moral
independence in shaping their careers, students would be enjoined to borrow
no money and to live within their current means, however modest those might
be. But the university might proclaim that its law school is a contribution to
the Republic, much in the tradition envisioned by the 18th century founders
19.

For comment on that change, see Paul Haskell, Why Lawyers Behave as They Do (Westview
Press 1998).

20.

Paul D. Carrington, On Ranking: A Response to Mitchell Berger, 53 J. Legal Educ. 301
(2003).
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of American university legal education,21 and maintained by the University of
Michigan in the time of Thomas Cooley.22 Their graduates would be instructed
to repay any indebtedness they felt they owed to the university by serving the
public interest as they might best identify that interest.
My Utopian law school would not do well in the rankings provided by US
News & World Report because it could not compete in the expenditure of money.
Imaginably, it might nevertheless attract adult students who were seriously
committed to their own moral values and were willing and able to manage
their own intellectual affairs. Their commitments and moral standards might
even be reinforced by the moral ambience created by their classmates. Its
graduates might actually prove to have special value to the causes they chose
to serve. My reading of “Bull” Warren’s memoir led me to believe that he
would join in this proposal.

21.

For a brief account, see Paul D. Carrington, The Revolutionary Idea of University Legal
Education, 31 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 527 (1990).

22.

Paul D. Carrington, Stewards of Democracy: Law as a Public Profession 25–34 (Westview
Press 1999).

